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What difference does it make? 
An essay review of Beyond Versus: The struggle to 
understand the interaction of nature and nurture; James 
Tabery; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 20141 
 
Peter J. Taylor 
Science in a Changing World graduate track 




Beyond versus makes its contribution to the thriving industry of books that clarify or 
recast nature-nurture issues through seven conceptual moves.  The first is to posit a 
divide between sociological and philosophical inquiry.  As Tabery depicts them, 
commentators on the science invoked in nature-nurture debates often focus on the 
racist or other political views of disputants or on their flawed understanding of scientific 
concepts.  Tabery, in contrast, as a philosopher of science, explains past and present 
disagreements as stemming from “a disagreement concerning how explanation works in 
science.”  (The other moves include explanatory and terminological divides, connecting 
associations to mechanisms, rank-change versus divergence-only interaction, a single 
category for nature-nurture.)  This review essay, while operating for the most part on the 
philosophical side of the divide, does promote more careful understanding of the 
science of data analysis.  This leads me to present alternatives to each of Tabery’s 
moves, including, eventually, the sociological-philosophical divide. 
 
 
                                                
1 A shorter version of this paper has been published as Taylor, Peter J. (2015) 
“Distinctions that make a difference? (An essay review of Beyond versus: The struggle 
to understand the interaction of nature and nurture by J. Tabery),” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Part C, 51: 70-76. 
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Genetic variants, definitions of interaction, philosophical concepts, analysis of 
observations versus experiments, a focus on agricultural versus human subjects, a 
book review…—all these things may make a difference.  Whether they do depends on 
other things, which may or may not be controllable.  I tease out the potential 
significance of these two opening sentences in this essay review of Beyond Versus.  
Along the way, I identify and assess seven key conceptual moves Tabery makes in his 
2014 contribution to thriving industry of books that clarify or recast nature-nurture issues 
(reviewed in Appendix 1).   
 
On Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical inquiry 
 
As Tabery depicts them, commentators on the science invoked in nature-nurture 
debates often focus on the racist or other political views of disputants or on their flawed 
understanding of scientific concepts.  Tabery, in contrast, as a philosopher of science, 
explains past and present disagreements as stemming from “a disagreement 
concerning how explanation works in science” (p. 5; from hereon page numbers on their 
own refer to Beyond Versus).  This essay operates for the most part on the 
philosophical side of the divide in order to provide meaningful commentary on Tabery’s 
distinctions and concepts.  I do not make sociological or political interpretations of 
flawed understandings, but I do promote more careful understanding of the science of 
data analysis.  This leads me to present alternatives to each of Tabery’s moves, 
including, eventually, the sociological-philosophical divide. 
 
On Move 2, Explanatory and terminological divides 
 
Tabery proposes that the history of nature-nurture debates is not about scientists 
contesting whether a given trait is determined by heredity or by the environment, but 
rather about the significance they to the interaction of heredity and environment.  The 
scientists in the three episodes he examines in Part I talk past each other because one 
side approaches interaction by partitioning variation, while the other seeks to elucidate 
mechanism (Table 1, drawn from p. 124).  The second of his key conceptual moves is 
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to identify this explanatory divide; understanding it enables us, Tabery argues, to move 
beyond versus as well as gain insight into some bioethical issues arising in this era of 
gene-based diagnosis.   The alternative I suggest is to view the relevant sciences as 
united under the variation-partitioning approach (Table 2) while divided by the meanings 
given to interaction, which are as different as chalk, cheese-sticks, and lipstick.  The 
basis for this alternative view, which draws on my formative research experience in the 
1970s analyzing data from large plant breeding trials (Taylor 2014a), needs to be laid 
out before Tabery’s three episodes can be examined.  
 





Thing to be explained Variation in a population Developmental process 
Causal question How much? How? 
Thing that does the explaining Cause of variation Causal mechanism 
Methodology Statistical Interventionist 
 
Table 2.  The Common Components of Analysis (this essay) 
 Variation-partitioning approach 
Thing to be analyzed Variation of an observed trait in a 
population in a range of situations 
“Causal” question How much difference in an observed trait 
is associated with differences in other 
things? 
Thing that accounts for the difference Thing that is significantly associated with 
the variation in the trait 
Methodology Statistical 
 
The science reviewed in Beyond Versus centers on the statistical analysis of 
data sets in which some given trait varies across a population of individuals (which may 
be people, plants, fruit flies, and so on) of various degrees of relatedness, raised in 
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various situations (which may be families, geographic locations, or specific conditions, 
e.g., plants grown with 50 kg/ha of nitrogen fertilizer).  The analyses are primarily of 
observational data, which is derived from individuals that can be subdivided into 
relevant categories (e.g., people raised in low socioeconomic status), and only in a few 
instances of experimental data, which involves assigning individuals randomly to be 
subject to specific conditions.  Sometimes the categories into which individuals are 
subdivided are defined by genealogical relatedness without knowledge of measurable 
genetic factors that underlie the relatedness or by location without knowledge of the 
underlying environmental factors in each location.  At other times the categories are 
defined by measured factors, such as presence or absence of a specific genetic 
mutation, socioeconomic status, amount of fertilizer applied, and so on.  (Factor is used 
in this essay in a non-technical sense, referring simply to some thing whose presence or 
absence can be observed or whose level can be measured.) 
Statistical analysis of data connects the observations of a given trait to a model 
that is static (in contrast to dynamic models such Newtonian equations governing 
bodies in orbit).  The models relevant to Beyond Versus can be divided into three types 
(Figure 1; expressed in equations in Appendix 2):  
A) a summation of variables (technical name effect) derived from the observations 
(e.g., the value for the trait in a certain plant variety averaged over all the 
locations in which it is grown);  
B) a summation of measured genetic and environmental factors, each weighted by a 
coefficient; and  
C) a summation that combines features of A and B and in which the environmental 
factor is experimentally manipulated.   
The summation for each kind of model also includes a non-systematic residual 
contribution.  By adjusting the details of the model (e.g., for type B, the values of the 
coefficients), the discrepancy between the observed values for the trait and the 
prediction of the trait’s value based on the model can be minimized. 
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Figure 1.  Three kinds of model for statistical analysis of observations on traits 
 
  Location/family (A),  
Measured environmental factor (B & C) 
  1 2 3 4 etc 
Variety/twin pair  
(A & C), 
Measured genetic factor 
(B) 
1      
2  trait   
3  values   
etc      
 
Trait value for an individual 
in a given cell* 
= overall average in data set for the trait + contributions for the Row + 
Column + Row-column-combination + Residual 
Row contribution for A & C = average over all the locations in which variety is raised** 
for B = measured genetic factor weighted by a coefficient 
Column contribution for A = average over all the varieties raised in that location 
for B & C = measured environmental factor weighted by a coefficient 
Row-column-combination 
contribution 
= average over individuals in that cell – contributions for Row & Column 
Residual = difference between trait value for an individual and the sum of the above 
contributions 
*  Some or many cells may be empty.  For example, in studies of human twins, members of each pair are 
raised in at most two families.  ** In practice, genealogical relatedness of individuals is also taken into 
account in estimating these contributions. 
 
The variation in the trait can be subdivided or partitioned into components 
associated with the different variables or measured factors in the models as well as the 
variation of the residual discrepancies.  Partitioning of variation, whichever type of 
model is used, always entails a “how much” question in that statistical analysis 
assesses which components of the trait variation are significantly greater than the 
residual.  When a component is not significant, the model is reformulated without the 
corresponding terms.  (Elaborations on these basic types and the technicalities of how 
statistical significance is assessed do not affect the conceptual points made in this 
essay.)  
In particular, statistical analysis of the partitioned variation assesses whether 
there is significant variation associated with interaction, the statistical term for the row-
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column-combination contributions in Figure 1.  The alternative view makes the following 
features of interaction clear: 
• Interaction in statistical analysis is not dynamic in the sense, say, of two soccer 
players contesting control of the ball.   
• Interaction is not synonymous with interdependence in a colloquial sense given that, 
even if interaction were zero, each kind of contribution is conditional on the full set of 
individuals and situations where they are observed.  (For example, in model A, the 
contribution of a variety/twin pair is not a property of the variety/twin pair, but is the 
value for the trait averaged over all the particular locations/families in which it is 
raised.  Change the set of varieties and locations in which the trait is observed, the 
size or even significance of the associations may change, as Turkheimer at al. 2003 
illustrates.  Similarly, in type B analyses, expand or contract the range of factors in 
which the trait is observed, the size or even significance of the associations may 
change.)  
• All three kinds of model are simple sums whether or not the interaction contributions 
are significant (which is good reason to avoid the term non-additivity that Tabery, p. 
22, following some researchers, uses to describe the presence of a significant 
interaction).   
• No conceptual or empirical connection exists between the terms in the different 
models, including the corresponding kinds of interaction, because the different kinds 
of analyses involve different things—variables derived from the observations versus 
measured factors. 
Let me address two objections to this last point.  The first possible objection: a 
gradient of measurable, albeit yet-to-be-identified factors might run through the 
variables derived from observations in type A and C analyses.  This, however, need not 
be the case, which is obvious when we think about, say, human height.  Pathways of 
development involving diverse combinations of genetic and environmental factors make 
intuitive sense when we note the different timing of growth and the make-up of the final 
height (e.g., long trunk, short legs versus short trunk, long legs) (Taylor 2014a, 19, 28ff).  
The lack of conceptual or empirical connection between measured factors and variables 
derived from the observations of traits is especially relevant in discussions of heritability.  
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This is the technical term for the variation among the row contributions in type A 
analysis as a fraction of the total variation and has nothing to do with the colloquial view 
that a trait is heritable when it involves transmission of a gene or genetic factor from 
parent to offspring.  (This regrettable ambiguity is amplified when researchers who are 
proficient in type A analysis refer to heritability as the “contribution of genetic differences 
to observed differences among individuals.” The quote is from Plomin et al. [1997, 83], 
but the interpretation is widespread and is repeated by Tabery, p. 47, 92; see Taylor 
2014a, 24ff.  The points noted briefly in Appendix 3 accentuate why the interpretation is 
misleading.  Similarly, interpretation of other fractions of variation in terms of differences 
in yet-to-be identified environmental factors is not warranted.)     
The second possible objection: measured environmental factors are involved in 
both type B and type C analyses.  However, the measured factors in type B analyses 
need not be modifiable (e.g., chromosomal sex is a commonly measured but non-
modifiable genetic factor).  Moreover, if the factors were modifiable, it does not follow 
that modifying them would generate the differences observed in the original data set.  In 
other words, it does not follow that the difference that “makes” a difference as exposed 
by statistical analysis of observational data is a factor we can modify to make the same 
difference again.  For example, lower income level is a significant factor associated with 
smoking rates, but there is no reason to expect that disbursing $10,000 to poor smokers 
would lead many of them to quit.  After all, the dynamics through which a person 
develops a low income and the dynamics through which a person becomes a smoker 
are separately and jointly far more complex than any static statistical model can 
capture.  For the variables in type A analysis, as well as for all terms in type C analysis 
other than the modifiable environmental factors, the point on conditionality above means 
that it is not possible to undertake an intervention to change “the thing associated with 
the variation.”  In light of this and because measured factors in type B analyses are not 
necessarily modifiable, Table 2 places “causal” in scare quotes and substitutes the 
conventionally ambiguous statistical term “accounts for” for Table 1’s “does the 
explaining.” 
The points made in the preceding paragraph become salient when we return 
later to discussion of mechanism.  First, let us revisit the historical and current debates 
 8 
examined by Tabery in light of the distinction between the three types of data analysis 
and the corresponding forms of interaction, where the analysis in each case involves 
partitioning of variation of an observed trait in a population. 
 
Reinterpreting three debates, historical and current 
Opponents in nature-nurture debates about humans are often debating whether 
or not society should do more to enhance the range of situations in which people 
develop.  In the Jensen-Lewontin debate discussed by Tabery (p. 46ff), Jensen 
observed that compensatory preschool education programs that began in the late 
1960s, such as Headstart, had only a transitory effect on boosting IQ test scores.  He 
saw the high heritability of IQ test scores, in combination with the lack of success in 
reducing the gap between the average scores for black versus white Americans, as 
conferring plausibility on the hypothesis that the gap is associated with differences 
between the races in some yet-to-be-determined genetic factors (Jensen 1969, 1970).  
In contrast, Lewontin, as Tabery (p. 50) notes, asserted that we can “boost IQ and 
scholastic achievement [by] as much or as little as our social values may eventually 
demand” (Lewontin 1970, 25).  Lewontin was critical of heritability estimation and, even 
more so, its interpretation, but one issue he did not take up was Jensen’s (1969, 39) 
assertion that the contribution of interaction to variation in “intelligence” is small in 
relation to other contributions.  Lewontin and Jensen were both operating on the 
variation-partitioning side of Tabery’s divide (Table 1), on the terrain moreover of type A 
analysis, not of measurable genetic and environmental factors.  One caveat: Later, the 
arguments of Lewontin (1974, 1982) made use of examples like those offered by both 
Fisher and Hogben in a debate forty years earlier. 
In the Fisher-Hogben debate of the 1930s (p. 15ff), both researchers examined 
cases in which different varieties were raised at different levels of an experimentally 
manipulated environmental factor (type C analysis).  Fisher found, for example, in 
potato varieties subject to various levels of manuring, that the additional contribution 
from variety-environmental factor combinations was not significant.  Hogben, on the 
other hand, found that the difference in numbers of eye facets in fruit fly strains was 
sensitive to the temperature at which flies were raised.  As Tabery (p. 32) notes, he 
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drew the lesson that social inequalities could be diminished or exacerbated by the 
medical, educational, and nutritional environments in which people were raised (echoed 
40 years later by Lewontin).  In opposing the eugenic sentiments of Fisher, Hogben 
depicted the methods of partitioning variation that Fisher had been pioneering as the 
basis for incorrect extrapolation of what has been observed to what was possible.  A 
problem for his critique is that the same variation-partitioning methods could be used for 
analysis of the data in both cases.  Moreover, because the environmental factors could 
be experimentally manipulated, both cases could go beyond establishing associations 
to illuminating mechanisms, albeit with the role of the genetic factors underlying the 
different varieties remaining unknown.  If we assume that the researchers had varied 
the environmental factors across the feasible range, Fisher’s trials were showing that 
the best yielding varieties on average could also get the best out of each level of the 
environmental factor (manuring).  There was no need for recommendations to farmers 
about what varieties to grow or to plant breeders about which varieties to breed from to 
be tailored to the specific level of manuring.  Hogben’s experiments, however, were 
showing that varieties could be influenced by an environmental factor (temperature) 
similarly at some levels and divergently at others.  In short, establishing what 
associations (especially interactions) and mechanisms applied in general was not a 
matter of contrasting concepts or methods—with Fisher and Hogben being on opposing 
sides of Tabery’s explanatory divide—but an empirical matter that depended on the set 
of varieties, the environmental factors manipulated when raising those varieties, and the 
trait.  Moreover, whatever Fisher and Hogben believed about the possibilities and 
pathways for improvement in human populations, no such experimental manipulations 
existed for human traits. 
What Fisher and Hogben lacked is now, in Tabery’s view, provided by research 
such as that of Caspi, Moffitt and colleagues on associations of human psychological 
traits with combinations of measured genetic and environmental factors (i.e., type B 
analyses).  Caspi et al. (2002), for example, reports on antisocial behavior in adults in 
relation to the activity of monoamine oxidase type A (MAOA) and childhood 
maltreatment; MAOA deficiency is a strong predictor of antisocial behavior only when 
the child has also been maltreated (Figure 2).  In other words, there is interaction 
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between the measured genetic and measured environmental factors.  The scientific 
debate about this kind of interaction, discussed by Tabery (p. 87ff), has revolved around 
meta-analyses assessing the generality of findings of significant interaction 
associations: Caspi et al. (2003) is confirmed by one study, but not by two others.  
Tabery notes that authors of the latter meta-analyses are advocates of using Genome-
Wide Association (GWA) studies to detect associations between traits and multiple 
genetic variants.  Tabery positions GWA studies on the variation-partitioning side of his 
explanatory divide, whereas he places research to detect association of traits with 
combinations of measured genetic and environmental factors on the mechanism-
elucidation side.  Under my contrasting view, both sides of the meta-analysis debate 
operate on the variation-partitioning side, this time on the terrain of type B analysis.   
   
 
 
Figure 2. Average adult composite antisocial behavior score in relation to levels of 
MonoAmineOxidaseA and level of childhood maltreatment for a sample from Dunedin, 
New Zealand (from Caspi et al. 2002, 852, reproduced with permission). 
 
In summary, none of the three scientific episodes involve disputants 
fundamentally divided by how to detect interaction even if they differ in the amount of 
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interaction found in their data sets.  However, from one episode to the next, we see a 
different kind of data analysis and meaning of the term interaction (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The significance of “interaction”* contributions in three scientific episodes 
reviewed by Tabery 
Episode 
Partitioning variation 
Observational data Observational-experimental 
data** 
A. summation of variables 
derived from the 
observations 
B. summation of 
measured 
factors 
C. Hybrid of A and B 
Fisher vs. 
Hogben 




(At the time) Jensen’s claim 
about lack of significance not 
a point of contest. 
 (Later) Lewontin uses examples 
like Fisher’s and Hogben’s to 
make his arguments. 





*  See text for elaboration of the points about the significance of interaction in the episodes.  The scare 
quotes are placed around “interaction” to emphasize that the term has different meanings in each of the 
three kinds of analysis.  ** Observed varieties and experimentally manipulated environmental factors 
 
Moves 3-5, Connecting associations to mechanisms 
 
[A] scientist explains a phenomenon by identifying and manipulating the variables 
in the mechanisms responsible for that phenomenon, thereby determining how 
those variables are situated in and make a difference in the mechanism (p. 109).   
 
The concept of mechanism, much discussed by philosophers of biology during the last 
decade or more, is the focus of Part II of Beyond Versus.  Suppose that statistical 
analysis of observations has identified variables or factors as associated with a given 
trait.  In light of the quote above, it is clear that, in order to connect these variables or 
factors to a mechanism, they have to be manipulable.  In the case of type C analysis, 
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the environmental factors can by definition be modified, but this is not obviously the 
case for the other variables and contributions in the three models used to assess 
associations.  
Tabery clearly imagines that measured genetic and environmental factors can be 
manipulated when, in the third of his key conceptual moves, he positions the type B 
analysis of Caspi and colleagues on the mechanism-elucidation side of his explanatory 
divide and labels the method interventionist.  Indeed Caspi et al. (2002, 853) conclude 
that their results “could inform the development of future pharmacological treatments.”  
The implication, in the context of research on childhood experience in relation to adult 
behavior, is that, if low MAOA children could be identified, prophylactic drug treatment 
could reduce their propensity to antisocial behavior as adults. To be more precise—and 
to highlight the interaction component—such treatment could reduce their vulnerability 
to childhood maltreatment in the sense of the risk that maltreatment would pave the way 
to undesired adult outcomes.  An easy rejoinder (as Tabery, p. 183-5 notes) would be 
that, if childhood maltreatment could be prevented, children’s low MAOA levels would 
no longer make them more likely to end up as antisocial adults.  Some authors, 
reviewed by Tabery (p. 173ff), have proposed monitoring and measures to prevent 
maltreatment for children diagnosed at birth as low MAOA or want to avoid the problem 
altogether by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and elimination of low-MAOA embryos. 
The preceding actions all depend on linking statistical associations to inquiry into 
mechanisms by viewing the measurable factors as ones that can be manipulated.  As a 
general perspective, this view is not warranted.  As noted earlier, the measured factors 
in type B analyses need not be modifiable and, if they were, it does not follow that 
modifying them would generate the difference observed in the original data set.  
Measured factors that are statistically significant but not modifiable serve as an 
invitation to researchers to probe further and try to expose underlying factors that might 
be modified.  For example, the higher incidence among African-American women of 
pre-term delivery of their babies has shown to be associated with self-reported 
experience of racial discrimination even after allowing for other factors associated with 
that outcome—alcohol and tobacco use, depression, education, and income (Mustillo et 
al. 2004).  Perhaps, self-reported experience of discrimination is itself associated with 
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further underlying factors, so that, as in the earlier smoking example, if there were 
policies to directly counter experiencing discrimination, they would not have the effect 
suggested by the static statistical model.  Perhaps, however, investigations that take 
this specific difference-associated-with-a-difference as an entry point for inquiry might 
eventually contribute to understandings in which subjective experiences get brought into 
a dynamic picture of the biological and social developmental processes that lead to pre-
term delivery—a picture, moreover, that could inform actions to reduce the disparity in 
pre-term delivery. 
These last sentences are intentionally tentative: It is a contingent matter whether 
the full picture of mechanisms and processes of development can be pieced together so 
as to inform possible actions.  Let us illustrate such contingency with a key case 
discussed by Tabery.  He notes (p. 121ff) that variation in human populations in a gene 
labeled BDNF (brain-derived neurotrophic factor) has been shown to be associated with 
variation in hippocampal activity and with a test of spatial memory.  As in the MAOA 
case, the association has led to proposals for action, in this case, BDNF-enhancing 
diets (evident by searching “BDNF boost spatial memory” on the internet).  To make the 
connection between this association and mechanisms, Tabery (p. 110ff) points not to 
such actions, but to experiments in which BDNF is manipulated.  The experiments, 
undertaken on mice, have resulted in a multi-level explanation of spatial memory that 
spans from changes in BDNF through activity of receptors, long-term potentiation of 
neurons, maps in the hippocampus, to navigation of mazes.  Now, the validity of mice 
as a model for humans is an issue well recognized by researchers.  Yet even to speak 
of “mice” and “humans” is to adopt a framing that discounts the variation among mice 
and the variation among humans.  If, instead, we were to pay attention to the variation, 
the first step would be to note that highly selected strains of laboratory mice are less 
variable than undomesticated populations (Rader 2004) and experiments made on such 
mice involve tightly controlled situations.  To what extent, it might be asked, do 
experimental observations hold for individuals from undomesticated populations raised 
in varied and far more complex situations? If mechanisms have been exposed using 
laboratory mice, to what extent do they depend on the controlled value of factors that 
are not typically enumerated when describing the mechanism? 
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  To ask such questions is not to counsel despair.  Experiments on humans are 
possible, albeit with varying degrees of control over the subjects and conditions.  Most 
notably, randomized control trials (RCTs) look for an association with a single 
manipulated factor, such as a drug versus a placebo, against a background of all other 
factors varying randomly in the population.  A newer approach, less well-known, is 
Mendelian randomization (Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007), which uses natural 
experiments to look for an association between, for example, C-reactive protein (CRP) 
levels in the blood and coronary heart disease (CHD) for people who have a rare 
genetic variant that leads to life-long elevated CRP levels, but otherwise vary randomly 
on other risk factors for CHD (such as smoking, bodymass index, and blood pressure). 
(CRP levels are associated with an increased incidence of diabetes, hypertension, and 
cardiovascular disease [Ridker et al. 2007], but Mendelian randomization cast doubt on 
any causal connection [C Reactive Protein Coronary Heart Disease Genetics 
Collaboration 2011].) 
In general, experiments on humans involve, however, less control than in RCTs 
or Mendelian randomization.  It should not be surprising that, as noted earlier, even 
when the measured factors can be modified, this need not replicate variation in the 
dynamics that generated the original data and thus that association. Returning to the 
MAOA case, medication throughout childhood could have side effects that might not 
emerge until later in life; an experiment that involved pre-implantation elimination of low-
MAOA embryos would bring at the very least all the long-term risks of being conceived 
by in-vitro fertilization (e.g., Hargreave et al. 2013).  Detecting and preventing childhood 
maltreatment might require intrusion into many households, surveillance, and 
intervention by state agencies, diversion of government budgets from other needs, and 
so on.  Such changes in the way society runs might well have consequences for the 
development of children, even those whose MAOA levels were not low.  The 
conundrum is that we would have to know a lot about the processes of development of 
children in their psychosocial context in order to interpret any experiment that sought to 
translate associations based on type B analyses into knowledge about mechanisms, let 
alone into insight about developmental processes. 
 15 
The contingency and complexities of relating type B associations to mechanisms 
speaks to the fourth and fifth conceptual moves in Beyond Versus: 
• drawing on the concordance of the BDNF-memory association found in humans with 
the experimental research on BDNF in mice, call such an association a population 
mechanism and portray these as a bridge between the variation-partitioning and 
mechanism-elucidation approaches; 
• adopt Waters’s concept of actual difference maker, which holds that, although many 
genes might possibly make a difference to the development of a trait, the cause of a 
difference in the trait can said to be the difference in the gene that is actually 
associated with that difference. 
These moves are hard to reconcile with this essay’s distinctions between type A and B 
associations, between unmodifiable and modifiable measured factors, and between 
associations and manipulating modifiable factors to generate the difference observed in 
the original data set.  If we take these distinctions into account, studies such as those of 
Caspi, Moffitt and colleagues detect associations whose relevance to elucidation of 
mechanisms is contingent.  In other words, a statistical difference maker does not 
necessarily make a difference.  The connection between an association in a population 
and mechanisms is susceptible to disconfirmation by experiments and invites scrutiny of 
the relationship of experimentally altered dynamics to the dynamics that generated the 
original data analyzed to show the association.  The association is also conditional: 
understanding it and formulating manipulations based on it requires attention to the 
other measured factors experimentally or statistically held constant.  The understanding 
and manipulations need not extrapolate beyond the original population and situations.  
In other words, possible difference makers are causally relevant. 
 
An aside on Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical inquiry 
 
One reading of Beyond Versus is that Tabery is impressed by advances in genomic 
science, which makes him optimistic about elucidating mechanisms by moving 
downward or inward into the molecular basis of traits.  Yet, interesting mechanisms may 
also be elucidated by moving upward or outward.  Consider human metabolic diseases, 
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taking phenylketonuria (PKU) as an example (Paul and Brosco 2013).  The cognitive 
development of individuals with PKU is extremely impaired by the level of the essential 
amino acid phenylalanine present in normal diets.  The level of phenylalanine can be 
manipulated to reduce greatly the impairment.  Social support practices can be adjusted 
to enhance compliance with the diet, as can policies regarding insurance coverage of 
the diet.  Changes in policies and practices regarding contraception and abortion can be 
investigated in relation to the incidence of so-called maternal PKU—children born to 
women who did not strictly maintain the diet.  Relevant mechanisms can also, of course, 
be investigated by moving downward/inward.  Mutations in the PAH gene were long ago 
shown to underlie PKU; the possibility of gene therapy, involving manipulation of PAH 
genes in stem cells, is now being considered; researchers are examining the 
responsiveness of individuals with different PAH mutations to a drug, BH4, that allows 
for a higher-protein diet.  Yet, such research on molecular genetic and pharmacological 
mechanisms depends on further upward/outward experiments ranging from social 
support to discourage individuals who take BH4 from going off the special diet 
altogether to the implementation of government subsidies for the biotechnology 
industry.  
Now, philosophers of biology might not inclined to expand their research on 
mechanisms in the upward/outward direction, but we can hardly come to conclusions 
about which direction makes the most difference—leads to the most impact for the 
science—without sociological inquiry into the funding of research and adoption of its 
findings. 
 
Move 6, Rank-change versus divergence-only interaction 
 
Reservations about connecting measured factors with mechanisms have to be put aside 
in order to review Tabery’s bioethical discussion, which makes up Part III of Beyond 
Versus.  In the sixth of the key conceptual moves that I identify, Tabery distinguishes 
gene-environment interactions in which the average response of the two genetic 
variants changes rank across the range of environmental factors from those in which 
the differences in averages simply diverges sufficiently for the contributions of the gene-
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environment combinations in type B analysis to be associated with a significant fraction 
of the trait variation.  Tabery is concerned that, in the rank-change cases, any action to 
improve the outcome at one end of the range will diversely affect the outcome for the 
other variant at the other end of the range.  For example, as indicated in Figure 2, 
boosting MAOA for low-MAOA children to reduce their vulnerability to severe 
maltreatment would increase the average anti-social behavior for low-MAOA children 
who are subject to no maltreatment. 
Tabery’s discussion of rank-change cases is based on plots, such as Figure 2, of 
averages for the trait for the different combinations of measured genetic and 
environmental factors.  Variation around the averages is discounted, as is also the case 
when considering prophylactic drug treatment and prevention of childhood maltreatment 
(mentioned earlier).  Such typological readings of data can be countered by paying 
attention to variation and noting that, within each combination of factors, people show a 
range of antisocial behaviors.  Among children who experienced probable or severe 
maltreatment, the ranges overlap, that is, some of the high MAOA individuals ended up 
with higher antisocial behavior scores than some of the low MAOA individuals.  Once 
the resources are invested to screen children for MAOA levels, a troubling issue of 
misclassification would arise given that attention would be focused on all low MAOA 
children. Indeed, how could treating children according to their genetic group be 
avoided if we do not know from a childhood MAOA assessment whether any particular 
individual is one who would go on, after maltreatment, to become an antisocial adult? 
(Taylor 2014a, 132ff).  If misclassification is seen as a bioethical concern, it is a concern 
that applies whether or not interactions are rank-changing. 
 
Move 7, A single category for nature-nurture 
 
The last conceptual move I identify in the book is actually one that Tabery makes at the 
very beginning of Beyond Versus: subsume the different ways that researchers and 
others invoke hereditary versus environmental influences under the one label nature 
versus nurture; anything that seems to involve interdependency of those influences 
becomes a matter of interaction (p. 1ff).  The discussion in this essay allows us, in 
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contrast, to distinguish four disjunct areas of nature-nurture science.  First, through type 
A analyses, researchers can try to compare how much variation is associated with 
differences among means for varieties, locations, variety-location combinations, and 
residual contributions (i.e., the ambiguously labeled genotypic, environmental, 
genotype-environment interaction, and error variance). Second, through type B 
analyses, researchers can try to compare how much variation is associated with 
differences in measured genetic factors, environmental factors, gene-environment 
interaction, and a residual component.  Third, either through type A or B analyses, 
researchers can compare the variation within groups (e.g., among Euro-Americans and 
among African-Americans) to the difference between the averages for the groups.  
Fourth, through investigations that might extend any of the preceding kinds of analysis 
of observational data, researchers can piece together a picture of the processes of 
development of a trait and, on that basis, speak to the fixity versus flexibility of traits.  (A 
fifth kind of nature-nurture science examines the basis for human traits in an 
evolutionary past, but that lies outside the issues discussed in this essay.)  
In the long history of nature-nurture debates, opposing sides often assume, 
imply, or propose that these different sciences are speaking to the same issues.  This 
sense of equivalence or, at least, mutual relevance is evident most notably in 
discussions that create or play on ambiguity in the meaning of the technical term 
heritability as well as in unwarranted interpretation of other fractions of variation in terms 
of differences in yet-to-be identified environmental factors.  The misinterpretations of 
heritability—or, more generally, of the relative sizes of different components of variation 
estimated using type A analyses—may seem moot if they are seen merely as heuristics 
to guide researchers when choosing which traits to investigate further to identify the 
measured genetic or environmental factors.  The use of molecular tools to identify 
genetic variants associated with variation in traits is illustrated by the BDNF and spatial 
memory case that Tabery discusses.  Yet for human medical traits, the most powerful 
new approach, Genome-Wide Association studies, has only found associations with 
genetic variants that correspond to a small increase in incidence of the trait (McCarthy 
et al. 2008).  The hope had been to expose variants corresponding to a major increase 
in incidence of the trait, and from that to gain insight into the mechanisms of the 
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disease.  Some researchers have conjectured that future advances in understanding 
will come from finding and examining rare variants associated with a strong effect on 
disease incidence (McClellan and King 2010).  This conjecture assumes heterogeneity 
in the genetic factors underlying the medical traits (see also Ioannidis et al. 2007).  The 
possibility of heterogeneity in the environmental factors as well (Taylor 2014a, 19ff) 
makes even more tenuous the heuristic connection from type A analyses (estimating 
heritability etc.) to type B analysis of measured genetic and environmental factors (see 
also Appendix 3).  Moreover, the results of the GWA studies might make a proponent of 
type B analysis less optimistic than a decade ago about identifying associations of a 
single genetic factor and a single environmental factor. 
The connection between the first two and the third kind of nature-nurture 
science—between group-average differences—is not addressed much in Beyond 
Versus.  A relevant conjecture I have is that, just as there was a manipulable level of a 
measured environmental factor in Fisher’s and Hogben’s type C data analyses, the 
components of variation derived from type A analysis have been imagined by 
researchers (e.g., in debates about heritability of IQ test scores, p. 46ff) to correspond 
to measurable, albeit yet-to-be-identified genetic and environmental factors.  It then 
seemed plausible that the same kinds of factors underlying variation within groups might 
be associated with the variation between groups (strictly, to the difference between the 
averages for the groups).  Another, more sociological, conjecture is that genomics 
allows people to posit a hereditary basis for traits of medical or social significance, such 
as intelligence, and this bolsters and is bolstered by the power of selective breeding in 
agriculture and a persistent or revived eugenic ideal of improving society by eliminating 
the defective biology of individuals. (Appendix 4 provides perspective on this nexus by 
reviewing what actions are actually possible based on type A associations.) 
The connection to the fourth kind of nature-nurture science—fixity versus 
flexibility of traits—is also not addressed much in Beyond Versus.  However, one 
relevant body of research is that of Kendler and colleagues, who have examined 
incidence of depression in relation to a wealth of measured factors over the life course 
as well as a factor derived from the relatedness of the individuals, which they label 
“genetic risk.”  In Kendler et al. (2002), for example, data on over 1,900 twins are used 
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to fit the incidence of major depression in women to a model that accounts for 52% of 
the variance in the trait.  The model is static, but it is structured to include connections 
from earlier-in-life to later-in-life factors, e.g., from risk by relatedness (genetic risk) to 
neuroticism to low self-esteem to low education through stressful life event to major 
depression, and thus provides a picture of development that is rich and plausible.  (The 
“Structural Equation Modeling” approach used works as if the value of the trait in model 
B were, in turn, a factor on the right hand side of a second model B, and so on.)  
Interestingly, many of the factors are conceivably modifiable (e.g., women with low self-
esteem could receive counseling), but no therapeutic or policy interventions are 
included in the factors examined even though only one of the many factors included in 
the implied picture of the development of depression fits firmly on the nature side.  In 
any case, associations with the interaction contributions in type A, B, or C analysis 
cannot be decisive.  The relevance of these associations depends, as mentioned under 
Move 2, on showing that the full range of locations or environmental factors has been 
included in the observations.  Turkheimer at al. (2003) shows, for example, that 
heritability of IQ test scores, typically stated as being around 60%, is almost zero in 
families of low socioeconomic status. 
In summary, the four different kinds of nature-nurture science are not speaking to 
the same issues.  The connection often implied between type A and type B analysis is 
not warranted except as a heuristic that is tenuous anyway; the tenuous heuristic is no 
basis for assuming that the same kinds of factors underlying variation within groups are 
associated with the difference between the averages for the groups; and models of 
multiple measured genetic and environmental factors have yet to progress to a place 
where they can speak to developmental fixity versus flexibility. 
 
Another alternative, in closing, to Move 1, Dividing sociological and philosophical 
inquiry 
 
This essay has suggested alternatives to seven conceptual moves that are key to 
Tabery’s account.  However, with respect to Move 1, the essay has, for the most part, 
joined him on the philosophical side.  How, it might be asked, is the conceptual 
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clarification we have both pursued supposed to make a difference?  To the extent that 
conceptual clarifiers envisage there to be scientists in our audience, are we saying or 
implying that we make systematic and clear what you had not—or more systematic and 
more clear?  Or, we are endorsing researcher A over researcher B, or we can extend 
researcher A’s thinking?  Whichever of these messages fits best, it seems that we want 
researchers to see that they have overlooked some things and decide to modify the 
science with the goal of improving their accounts of the phenomena that constitute 
reality.  Yet, as sociology and history of science remind us, critique—which includes 
conceptual clarification—is rarely decisive in shifting science.  The production of 
scientific knowledge also involves many, diverse practical considerations as 
researchers employ equipment, experimental protocols, citations, the support of 
colleagues, the reputations of laboratories, metaphors, rhetorical devices, publicity, 
popular debates, funding, and so on (Latour 1987; Law 1987).  Researchers linking 
such heterogeneous resources are also traversing different domains of social action—
social worlds—to which they contribute to continuity as well as change (Clarke and 
Fujimura 1992).  (The diverse social worlds that intersect in the nature-nurture sciences 
are readily seen by searching “nature nurture” in google books; see Appendix 1.) 
Even when conceptual clarification is directed, more modestly, at commentators 
on nature-nurture science, including philosophers of science, how much difference can 
be made by a book or a book review is an open question.  The answer would depend 
on how much the attention, topics, funding, metaphors, and so on of the commentators 
draw from the many and various currents of the genomic era (Taylor 2014b).  To invoke 
this sociological sphere is not to counsel despair for those of us with a penchant for 
conceptual clarification.  Rather, we can view the sociological embeddedness of our 
audiences and of ourselves as an invitation to extend the necessarily partial 
contributions we make to modifying scientific knowledge.  Examination of conceptual 
developments within the sciences can lead us into interpretive questions about the 
social influences shaping scientists’ work or its application, which, in turn, can lead to 
new questions and awareness of alternative approaches in those sciences (Taylor 
2014a, 42ff).  In this spirit, we could delve into the cross-reinforcement of distinct 
nature-nurture sciences or the conflation of different meanings of interaction.  We could 
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puzzle over how associations exposed by statistical analysis are so readily translated 
into proposals for action.  And so on.  Many interesting inquiries remain for conceptual 
clarifiers and other commentators who want to help science and society—indeed, 
science-in-society—move beyond nature versus nurture. 
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Appendix 1.  A review of books that clarify or recast nature-nurture 
issues 
 
The list of books below is a selection derived from searching “nature nurture” in google 
books (see http://bit.ly/NvNbooks).  The table to follow summarizes positions that run 
through more than one book. 
 
Number Position Contrasting position presented in the body of the 
essay 
1. Heritability is a measure of the 
effects of genes and the remainder 
of the variation is the effect of the 
environment. 
Not correct.  Type A analyses (estimating heritability 
etc.) have a tenuous heuristic connection with type B 
analysis of measured genetic and environmental 
factors (see also Appendix 3). 
2. The contribution of the environment 
can be partitioned into shared and 
non-shared components.  (The non-
shared eclipses the shared.) 
No position stated in the essay.  However, just as in 1, 
the position implies a connection between type A and 
B analysis and is thus questionable (Taylor 2014a, 
115-116).  
3. Nature-nurture debate refers to 
relative strength of genetic and 
environmental influences in the 
development of traits of an 
individual, in variation across a 
population, and in differences 
between groups. 
Position 3 combines four kinds of nature-nurture 
science, which have no clear conceptual or empirical 
connection between them. 
4. Traits are caused by complex 
interactions between genes and the 
environment at every stage of 
biological and psychological 
development. 
In a dynamic sense of interaction, yes.  The nature-
nurture sciences reviewed in this essay concern, 
however, the analyses of quantitative data that do not 
directly address development and in which interaction 
is a statistical concept.  Investigations that extend the 
analysis of observational data are needed for 
researchers to piece together a picture of the 
processes of development of a trait (and, on that basis, 




5. In analyses of observational data 
categorized by some genetic factors 
and environmental factors 
contributions* provide insight about 
intervention to alter the trait in 
question. [*meaning as given in this 
essay] 
Contributions in any analysis of variance (types A-C): 
a) are conditional on the full set of individuals (or 
varieties) and situations (or locations) where they are 
observed; and b) are not necessarily modifiable to 
reproduce that variation. 
 
Book Position in relation to 
issues raised in the 
body of the essay 
Position in relation to other issues 
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1985). 
Myths of Gender. New York: 
Basic Books. 
4. Genetic does mean unchangeable.  In 
particular, children show flexibility in gender 
self-concept.  Views of sexual and gender 
development are biased towards male 
development.  
Flynn, J. R. (2012). Are We 
Getting Smarter? Rising IQ 
in the Twenty-First Century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Focuses on marked differences between 
generations in average test scores, with some 
attention to differences between racial groups 
and gender.  Offers explanation of the former 
(rejecting hypotheses that genetics, in the 
form of outbreeding, could be involved).  Issue 
not settled whether racial differences are 
genetic or environmental in origin. 




4, but presents 1, 2, and 
3 without disputing them 
on their own terms. 
Nature-nurture science (1-3) does not provide 
insight into the development of traits of an 
individual or the influence of development on 
evolution. 
Harris, J. R. (2009). The 
nurture assumption: Why 
Children Turn Out the Way 
They Do. New York: Free 





1, 2, 3 + the environment 
is shaped by the child’s 
genes, not by shared 
family upbringing.   
The child’s interaction in peer groups is the 
primary and natural determinant of their 
personality. 
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Kaplan, G. and L. J. Rogers 
(2003). Gene Worship: 
Moving Beyond the 
Nature/Nurture Debate over 
Genes, Brain, and Gender. 
New York: Other. 
Addresses separately all 
four kinds of nature-
nurture science.  
Focusing especially on gender and sex 
development, modifiable interactions occur at 
every stage of development. 
Keller, E. F. (2010). The 
Mirage of a Space between 
Nature and Nurture. 
Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
1 + notes slippage 
between heritability and 
heritable. 
More attention is needed to what genes do 
during development. 
Lewontin, R. C., S. Rose, et 
al. (1984). Not in Our 
Genes: Biology, Ideology 
and Human Nature. New 
York: Pantheon. 
Careful in definition and 
interpretation of 
heritability (but not 
explicit about the 
contrasting position to 1 
presented in the body of 
the essay). 
High heritability does mean unchangeable.  
Lewontin, R. C. (2000). It 
Ain't Necessarily So: The 
Dream of the Human 
Genome and Other 
Illusions. New York: New 
York Review of Books (esp. 
Chapter 1) 
1. Heritability provides no information about 
changeability (see alternative to 5). 
Longino, H. (2013). 
Studying human behavior: 
How scientists investigate 
aggression and sexuality. 
Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
1, 2, 3 + heritable and 
heritability treated as 
synonyms. 
Pluralism: Each method of studying behavior 
is best seen as a partial view, not a competing 
view to other methods, such as molecular 
behavioral genetics. 
Moore, D. S. (2001). The 
Dependent Gene: The 
Fallacy of "Nature vs. 
Nurture". New York: W. H. 
Freeman. 
4, but presents 1 & 3 
without disputing them. 
The focus of research should be on the 
development of traits of an individual (for 
which 1 & 3 are not helpful). 
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Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank 
Slate: The Modern Denial of 
Human Nature. New York: 
Viking. 
1, 2, 3 + heritable and 
heritability treated as 
synonyms. 
Opposition to hereditarian explanations 
follows from the theory that the mind is a 
blank slate, which distorts understandings of 
gender, upbringing, violence, and more. 
Plomin, R. (1990). Nature 
and Nurture: An Introduction 
to Behavioral Genetics. 
Pacific Grove, CA: 
Brooks/Cole. 
1, 2  
Ridley, M. (2003). Nature 
Via Nurture : Genes, 
Experience, and What 
Makes Us Human. London: 
Fourth Estate. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (with 
reservations about the 




The action of genes (nature) is influenced by 
experience (nurture).  The effect of that 
experience or environment varies with the 
genes an organism has. 
Rutter, M. (2006). Genes 
and Behavior: Nature-
Nurture Interplay Explained. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
1, 2, 5 (except questions 
that non-shared eclipses 
the shared). 
Special attention given to interaction between 
measured genetic and measured 
environmental factors. 
Tomasello, M. and D. I. 
Slobin (2005). Beyond 
Nature-Nurture: Essays in 
Honor of Elizabeth Bates. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
 
 In the development of language, knowledge 
comes from the “interaction between genes, 
bodies, and environments, unfolding 
overtime… and the ways in which structures 
can arise without being prespecified.” 
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Appendix 2.  Three types of model for statistical analysis of 
observational and experimental data 
 
 
yijk =  m  + vi  + lj + vlij  + rijk    (A)  
where yijk denotes the observed value of the trait y for the ith variety* in the jth location* 
and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of the following variables: 
m for a base level for the trait; 
vi for the contribution of the ith variety; 
lj for the contribution of the jth location; 
vlij for the additional contribution from the i,j variety-location combination not already 
given by the preceding two contributions; and 
rijk for the residual contribution. 
 
yijk =  mB  + αgi  + βej + γgiej + rijk    (B)  
where yijk is observed value of the trait y for the ith measured genetic factor under the jth 
measured environmental factor and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of the 
following measured factors multiplied by coefficients a, b, g: 
mB for a base level for the trait; 
αgi for the contribution of measured genetic factor i; 
βej for the contribution of measured environmental factor j; 
γgiej for the additional contribution from the i,j gene-environment combination not 
already given by the preceding two contributions; and 
rijk for the residual contribution. 
 
yijk =  mC  + vi + βej + γiej + rijk    (C)  
where yijk is observed value of the trait y for the ith variety under the jth experimentally 
manipulated environmental factor and kth replication, which is modeled as a sum of 
the following variables and measured factors multiplied by coefficients β, γi: 
mC for a base level for the trait; 
vi for the contribution of the ith variety; 
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βej for the contribution of experimentally manipulated environmental factor j; 
γiej for the additional contribution from the i,j variety-environment combination not 
already given by the preceding two contributions; and 
rijk for the residual contribution. 
 
* Varieties are often called genotypes despite the lack of knowledge of the measurable 
genetic factors that underlie the relatedness of individuals in a variety/genotype.  
Similarly locations are called environments without knowledge of the environmental 
factors present in each location/environment.  In any case, in the equation for type 
A, to use the symbols gi and ej for genotype and environment would invite confusion 
with the conceptually and empirically distinct terms in the equation for type B. 
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Appendix 3.  Heritability of a trait does not measure the contributions 
of genetic differences to observed differences among individuals 
 
1.  Readers with a technical knowledge of heritability may note that, when 
estimating heritability from datasets in which varieties have varying degrees of 
genealogical relatedness (e.g., identical or monozygotic twins versus fraternal or 
dizygotic twins), models often refer to theoretical genes that each add a small 
contribution to the trait.  However, analyses built around these models are of 
observations of traits, so there must be alternative formulations making no reference to 
genes (Taylor 2014a, 55-76). 
2. Consider one way to estimate heritability for a human trait, namely, comparing 
the similarity of identical twins, who share all their genes, with the similarity of fraternal 
twins, who share a smaller fraction; in both cases, the twins are raised together. Even if 
the similarity between twins or a set of close relatives is associated with the similarity of 
yet-to-be-identified genetic factors, the factors may not be the same from one set of 
relatives to the next, or from one location to the next. In other words, the underlying 
factors may be heterogeneous (Taylor 2014a, 19). 
3.  The possibility of underlying heterogeneity disturbs any intuition that a 
measurable genetic factor (or composite of factors) runs through the differences among 
variety means.  We would not assume such a genetic gradient exists if the varieties 
were from different species or taxonomic classes.  Yet the partitioning of variation 
involved in estimation of heritability and other components could, in principle, be 
undertaken even if varieties were not from the same species (Taylor 2014a, 28ff). 
4.  Even if there were such a gradient, it is difficult to move from type A variation-
partitioning to hypotheses about underlying measurable factors even in the ideal case of 
such analysis, namely, the full agricultural evaluation trial (see Appendix 4).  For the 
analysis of human observations, where a variety (or genotype) is replicated at most two 
times in at most two locations (environments), it is not possible to group similar varieties 
and locations and, on that basis, generate hypotheses about underlying factors (Taylor 
2014a, 30ff). 
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5.  To add further ambiguity, in recent years the term heritability has begun to be 
used to refer to the fraction of variation in a trait associated with variation in Single-
Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) as examined by Genome-Wide Association (GWA) 
studies.  There is no conceptual connection between this new heritability and the 
classical concept (Taylor 2014a, 124-5). 
6.  The slippage between, or conflation of, type A and B analysis is fostered by 
ambiguous terms.  In agricultural trials, varieties have often been called genotypes even 
though no claim is made that a pair of alleles—the strict meaning of genotype—defines 
the variety.  Variation among the variety contributions in model A is then variation 
associated with difference between genotype means (or “genotypic values”), shortened 
to genotypic variance (variance being the technical statistical measure of variation) and 
then, unfortunately given its ambiguity, to genetic variance.  Similarly, variation among 
location means is often referred to as environmental variance.  Yet no genetic or 
environmental factors are used in the making of type A analyses; genetic variance does 




Appendix 4.  Actions based on type A analysis, including assessment 
of the degree of interaction, and to investigation of mechanisms 
The distinction between type A and B analysis is illuminated by examining the 
possibilities and limitations of type A analysis with respect to actions based on the 
analysis, including assessment of the degree of interaction, and to investigation of 
mechanisms. 
Consider, as an example of data and analysis of type A, the case of an 
agricultural evaluation trial where it is possible to observe a trait, say, yield, in a set of 
plant varieties in each of a set of locations, and to raise replicates for each variety-
location combination (e.g., Byth et al. 1976).  The variety contributions (see Figure 1 
and Appendix 2) can be simply given by subtracting the overall mean for the data from 
the means of each variety when averaged over all the locations and replications in 
which it is grown.  Similarly, for the location and variety-location interaction 
contributions.  If the variation of the variety means is significant and we can imagine 
growing in the same locations the varieties that have the best mean yields, then we 
would expect to improve yields overall.  Secondarily, plant breeders may cross the best 
varieties overall and expect yield improvement in proportion to how much of the 
variation is associated with the variety means.   If some of the crosses turn out not to 
yield well, they can be discarded, while only those that yielded well get used. 
Now, if the variety-location interaction contribution is also significant—which is 
typically the case in large crop evaluation trials (e.g., Byth et al. 1976)—then one variety 
may be highest yielding in one location but not in another—or, at least, the difference 
between any two varieties may change substantially from location to location (Taylor 
2014a, 55).  Interaction in this type A sense makes it difficult for agricultural researchers 
to provide a single recommendation to farmers on which variety to plant.  
Recommendations about what to grow need, instead, to be tailored to some subset of 
the locations. 
The last two paragraphs indicate that crop recommendations and plant breeding 
decisions can proceed without an understanding of mechanisms.  Indeed, the variables 
associated with the partitioned variation are not modifiable things.  However, while such 
actions are being taken, researchers can also go on to investigate further to expose 
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what it is happening in the locations with the best yields. As described in Taylor (2014a, 
95ff), 
varieties can be grouped by similarity in responses across all locations using 
techniques of cluster analysis (Byth et al. 1976). Similarly, locations can be 
grouped by similarity in responses elicited from varieties grown across those 
locations. Varieties in any resulting group tend to be above average for a location 
in the same locations and below average in the same location. The wider the 
range of locations in the measurements on which the grouping is based, the 
more likely it is that the ups and downs shared by varieties in a group are 
produced by the same conjunctions of measurable factors… For example, 
imagine a group of plant varieties that originated from particular parental or 
ancestral stock that is more susceptible to plant rusts (a form of parasitic fungi), 
and that these varieties had a poor yield in locations where rainfall occurred in 
concentrated periods on poorly drained soils. The obvious hypothesis about 
genetic factors modulated by environmental factors is that these varieties share 
genes from the parental stock that are related to rust susceptibility and this 
susceptibility is evident in the measurements of yield in locations where the 
rainfall pattern enhances rusts. 
On the basis of such a hypothesis, plant breeders might cross the rust-susceptible 
varieties that yield well in other locations with rust-resistant varieties and look for 
progeny that are resistant and yield well in the rust-promoting locations.  Alternatively, 
the original varieties might be evaluated in the same sites but with enhanced soil 
drainage practices.  Success or failure in exposing mechanisms at the level of, for 
example, parental stock used in crosses or soil drainage will affect whether the 
researchers see any need to delve further into the genetic and environmental factors 
that influence the yields shown by the varieties in the various locations where they are 
grown.  In other words, whether knowledge about mechanisms is needed for progress 
in agricultural science based on type A analyses all depends.  
Now let us contrast the situation when the observations are of traits in human 
populations.  First, the option of selective breeding and discarding crosses that turn out 
not to “yield” well is not available.  Nor is it possible to reduce the interaction 
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contribution by grouping of varieties and subsequently forming hypotheses based on 
those groups.  In short, type A analysis of human data does not provide a basis for 
actions based on the analysis or investigation of mechanisms.  Regarding the 
assessment of the degree of interaction, it is possible, given the appropriate data sets, 
to separate the variety contributions from those of the variety-location (genotype-
environment) combinations.  The data needed is, for the one population, of twins raised 
apart, twins raised in the same family, and unrelated individuals raised in the same 
family (Taylor 2014a, 62).  Such data sets are, however, rare.  Plomin et al. (1977) is 
often cited in the context of claims that such interaction variation is not significant for 
humans, but this work considers as a proxy for variety-location interaction a quantity 
derived from a type B analysis of, for example, data on educational attainment, in which 
the measured factors are the average for biological parents and the average for 
adoptive parents.   Tabery (152ff) reviews the evidence for low values of such proxy 
measures, but how well they reflect the actual type A variety-location interaction is hard 
to assess in the absence of studies for a range of human traits in which the classes of 
data are collected that allow the separation of variety from variety-location contributions.  
It is necessary to show that the latter contributions are negligible in order to be sure that 
reported heritability estimates for human traits capture only the differences among 
variety (genotype) contributions.  Ditto, to interpret the trend that Plomin (1999, C26) 
and others have noted for heritability estimates to increase over people's lifetimes.  It 
could be that the interaction contribution, subsumed in estimates labeled as heritability, 
is increasing over time. For this reason, over and above the points made in Appendix 2, 
interpreting this trend as evidence that genetic differences come to eclipse 
environmental differences (Plomin 1999, C26) is not warranted (Taylor 2014a, 73-74). 
